We analyze factors driving exercise price policy for executive option plans (ESOPs) as well as their scope in a country where firms are not subject to the tax and accounting considerations that have seemed to lead to a dominance of at-the-money options in the U.S. Our "unbounded" data for Finland provides us with an excellent opportunity to investigate whether contract design is consistent with compensation theory. Our findings are largely consistent with predictions from the optimal contracting literature. The size of the plan is negatively related to Tobin's Q and firm size and is positively related to proxies for monitoring costs, which also influence the probability of launching premium ESOPs. However, our results also show that the premium (out-of-the-moneyness) is negatively related to prior stock returns and cash flow to assets, which may indicate higher managerial powers, leading to more in-the-money options, in well-performing firms. Finally, we also report a positive relationship between the premium and the length of the vesting period, indicating an effort to keep the incentives for management from falling over time.
Introduction
Most empirical studies of equity-based compensation concentrate on the incentives provided by them (e.g., Yermack 1995). Incentives are typically measured by some (absolute or relative) measure of pay-to-performance sensitivity. For executive options, the pay-to-performance sensitivity is a function of the option delta (i.e., related to the exercise price in relation to the stock price as well as, e.g., stock volatility) and the grant size (see e.g., the option-specific pay-performance sensitivity of Hall and Murphy, 2000 and 2002) . Hall and Murphy (2000) consider the exercise-price policy as perhaps the central design issue regarding executive options. Paradoxically, the variation of this key variable, the exercise price at the grant date, has been rather limited in the U.S., where most executive options have been granted near at-the-money.
1 Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) provide a rationale for this phenomenon, using both elements related to managerial risk aversion and elements from U.S. tax and accounting considerations. 2 Additional arguments like this are needed, as the predominance of at-the-money options would otherwise at least partly remain a puzzle, given the flatness of the incentive-maximizing exercise price range.
We provide unique evidence of the determinants of stock option design using data for a market where exercise price setting is not restricted by tax or accounting considerations. Such a setting allows us to investigate factors driving the key variable, the exercise price, which has a low variation in the U.S.
Recent contributions by, for example, Dittman and Yu (2009) and Palmon and Venezia (2009) suggest that options should be in-the-money (at least in the absence of U.S. tax considerations). Our sample, where the setting of the exercise price is "unbounded" by institutional restrictions, serves as an excellent experimental laboratory for such theoretical predictions. Besides the exercise price, we further focus on another important design attribute, the scope of the plan. 3 Finally, we also study the effect of the vesting period on the exercise price. Bebchuk et al. (2002) notice that little attention has been given to the fact that firms (in the U.S.) use the same exercise price for options regardless of the vesting period. Our option, tranche-specific data for Finland, allows us to study this issue in a setting where exercise price setting is rather free of restrictions.
We find that the ratio of the exercise price to the stock price on granting date (the out-of-themoneyness of the option) is negatively related to the prior stock return. This result may be interpreted as shareholders responding to a poor prior stock price performance by requiring a higher subsequent stock price appreciation to reward managers. Alternatively, the result suggests that managers have more negotiation power regarding the design of compensation in firms with greater prior stock price performance. Moreover, our results indicate that investment intensity, cash flow, and monitoring costs are associated with the likelihood of granting premium (out-of-the-money) stock options.
Our results show that the scope (measured as the fraction of equity obtained upon exercise of all granted stock options) is negatively related to Tobin's Q. Treating Tobin's Q as a measure of firm performance, this would suggest that poorly performing firms grant larger stock option plans with greater scope. In addition, we find that the scope of stock option plans is increasing simultaneously with proxies for monitoring costs, consistent with traditional principal-agent theory arguing that greater monitoring cost/difficulty should be positively related to the amount of equity-based compensation used (Holmström, 1979, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) . We also find that the scope of the stock option plan is greater in broad-based plans and in plans with dividend protection. 4 Finally, we find that when institutional restrictions concerning exercise price setting are absent, there is a positive relationship between the out-of-the-moneyness of the option tranches and the length of their vesting period. This finding is contrary to the view of Bebchuck et al. (2002) on managerial power leading to same exercise prices ("a royalty on the passage of time," as Buffet has put it).
Instead, our results suggests that when corporate governance is stronger (when the shareholders' meeting approves the conditions for exercise price setting), higher exercise prices are set for options that become exercisable further in the future in order to keep the managerial incentives from diminishing over time.
We contribute to the relatively thin literature (as noted by Dahiya and Yermack 2008) on inter-firm differences in the design and implementation of executive stock option plans. There are accepted theoretical arguments for using different design elements in different types of firms, for example, due to differences in monitoring costs, but very little empirical evidence on their actual validity.
Furthermore, while there has been low variation in the exercise price in the U.S. and thus low focus on it as a variable, the introduction of FAS 123(R) in 2005 may bring a change. FAS 123(R) has, by introducing mandatory options expensing irrespectively of the in-the-moneyness of the option, ruled out some of the earlier obstacles for other than fixed-plan at-the-money options. As a result, evidence from another market, where options with differing exercise prices have been subject to equal treatment in tax and accounting rules, may be of interest with respect to the potential future development on other markets as well. 4 Further specification tests show that the likelihood of granting broad-based stock option plans is increasing in institutional ownership and cash flow constraints and is decreasing in firm size. Broad-based stock option plans are also more likely to be granted among firms in growth industries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses and the research design used in the study. Sample selection and data characteristics are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 reports the empirical results, and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Hypothesis development and research design
Compensation theory suggests that it is the principal's ability to observe the agent's actions that determines the form of compensation. If the appropriate actions are known and observable, the optimal incentive contract pays the agent (manager) a fixed salary and penalizes her for suboptimal behavior. However, if managerial actions are at least partly unobservable, tying managerial compensation to productive outcomes (such as firm value) is necessary to induce the manager to behave optimally (Holmström, 1979) .
The ability of shareholders to observe and evaluate the actions undertaken by managers is affected by the complexity of managerial tasks. A greater complexity of the decisions required from managers makes it more difficult for shareholders to monitor these decisions. Consequently, theory suggests that proxies for monitoring cost, such as firm size, asset complexity, and growth opportunities should be related to the amount of equity-based compensation used and to the power of the incentives provided by compensation (see, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) . This prediction has gained strong support in empirical work. 5 More recently, however, the optimal contracting literature has been questioned by authors who suggest that the form and design of executive compensation is determined by managerial power and extraction of rents (Bebchuk et al., 2002) . In order to contrast and test these theories, we employ as determinants variables from both the optimal contracting literature and the managerial power literature.
The following subsections discuss the hypothesized relations between firm characteristics and stock option contract design. First, we discuss the expected relations between firm attributes on one hand and the scope of stock option plans and the exercise price of stock options on the other, respectively, in Sections 2.1. and 2.2. Second, in Section 2.3, we present and motivate some additional tests that are performed.
The scope of stock option plans
Our dependent variable is the relative size of the stock option plan. We first measure it by the stock option overhang (dilution), that is, the fraction of equity obtained upon exercise of all granted stock options. 6 Second, we measure the scope as the BS value to MV of equity, that is, the Black-Scholes value of the plan divided by the market value of equity at the grant date. 7 See Appendix A for a detailed description regarding the calculation of the variables.
Under the optimal contracting hypothesis, the firm (the board/compensation committee and, ultimately, the shareholders) designs compensation arrangements exclusively for the purpose of alleviating the agency problem between shareholders and managers (see, e.g., Ross, 1973; Holmström, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) . Hence, under this approach, we expect a negative relation between CEO ownership and the scope of stock option plans, as direct share ownership may be treated as a substitute for stock option compensation. In contrast, under the managerial rent extraction hypothesis of Bebchuk et al. (2002) , a part of the agency problem is that executives use their compensation to provide themselves with rents. 8 Because CEO ownership measures the direct voting power of the CEO, it is plausible to expect a positive relation between CEO ownership and the scope of stock option plans under the managerial rent extraction hypothesis.
Based on two arguments, we expect Ownership concentration to be negatively related to the scope of the stock option plans. First, if concentrated ownership leads to more efficient monitoring of the management, the need for equity-based compensation should be reduced. Furthermore, ownership concentration is assumed to be inversely related to managerial power and should thus reduce possibilities for managerial rent extraction.
Institutional ownership is used as a proxy for professional shareholders. Professional shareholders are expected to have an articulated interest in developing corporate governance mechanisms, which may result in a positive relationship between institutional ownership and the scope of the stock option plan. On the other hand, managerial power is expected to be decreasing in institutional ownership, thus supporting a negative relation.
An interesting institutional detail in Finland (unavailable for examination in the U.S.) is state ownership. Political interests causing public attention and pressure arising from state ownership is expected to reduce the state's degrees of freedom in the design of executive compensation. With increased state control, managerial rent extraction is also expected to decrease. Hence, we expect a negative relation between state ownership and the scope of the stock option plan.
The expected sign for firm size is more ambiguous. One can approach this question both from the agency (monitoring) perspective as well as from optimal compensation theory (free of agency costs).
From the agency point of view, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that large firms are more difficult (costly) to monitor, which would motivate greater equity incentives in large firms. Larger firms are often also riskier, which would again support higher incentives for a risk-averse manager.
Accordingly, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) hypothesize that the level of managerial equity holdings should be greater in larger firms. However, there are also other views to this relationship. Schaefer (1998) reports an inverse relationship between pay-performance sensitivity (measured on a "dollarto-dollar" basis) and firm size. Because grant size (together with delta) is a component in payperformance sensitivity, this result might imply a negative relationship between the scope of option plans and firm size. Baker and Hall (2004) obtain results in line with those of Schaefer's (using a similar measure), but they also show that when a CEO's wealth is regressed on percentage changes in firm value (instead of absolute changes), the relationship is a strong positive one. 9 They continue by estimating the elasticity of the CEO's marginal product with respect to firm size and obtain an estimate of 0.4; that is, they find that CEO marginal products rise strongly, but not proportionally, with firm size. In our model, we are using a proportionate (relative) option plan scope variable (relative to the equity of the firm). If productivity would rise proportionally with firm size and its equity (given unchanged leverage), and if compensation would proportionally follow, our (relative) measure for scope would remain constant and therefore be independent of any measure for firm size.
However, if CEO productivity rises less than proportionately with firm size, as argued by Baker and Hall (2004) , a negative relationship would follow.
Theory and prior empirical evidence suggests that equity-based compensation is positively related to the growth opportunities of the firm. This would suggest a positive relation between the scope of stock option plans and both Tobin's Q and investment intensity, measured as Investment to capital.
However, several prior studies (see, e.g., Morck et al., 1988 ) employ Tobin's Q as a measure of firm performance. If one assumes that the expected marginal benefits of equity-based compensation are decreasing in firm performance, then the shareholders of such well-performing firms can be less willing to provide large equity incentives. This would result in a negative relationship between scope on the one hand and Tobin's Q and profitability (measured as the ratio of cash flow to assets) on the other.
We also include a measure for financial leverage (long-term debt to assets) and expect a negative relation between financial leverage and the scope of stock option plans. The arguments of Jensen (1986, 1993) imply that the disciplinary role of debt may reduce agency costs, in which case firms with high financial leverage have a reduced need for equity incentives as a control mechanism. 10 We include the capital to sales ratio and firm focus to measure monitoring complexity and expect negative relations between both variables and the scope of stock option plans. 11 In addition, we further decompose the variable measuring firm focus into mature industry and growth industry indicators, as we expect to find differences in the use of equity incentives between these groups. See Table 2 , Panel C for details concerning which industries have been classified as mature vs. growth industries.
Firm risk is included to measure monitoring difficulty as a result of noisiness in the firm's operating environment (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and the extent to which risk-averse managers can be incentivized via stock and option holdings (see, e.g., Himmelberg et al., 1999) . The expected relation between firm risk and the scope of stock option plans is thus subject to ambiguity. In empirical work, Jin (2002) finds that executive pay becomes less sensitive to performance as unsystematic risk increases but finds no relation between systematic risk and pay-for-performance. We thus also examine whether the type of risk affects the relation by decomposing Total risk into Systematic risk
and Unsystematic risk components.
We also include indicator variables for a prior plan in effect and a broad-based plan. We expect a smaller scope of stock option plans if a prior plan is in effect. A broad-based plan is expected to have 10 Furthermore, John and John (1993) analyze the relation between firms' compensation policies and capital structure and predict that highly levered firms will provide less equity incentives to motivate optimal choices regarding managerial risk. The intuition of this argument is straightforward, i.e., if managers have strong incentives to increase the value of equity, creditors will demand higher risk premia for providing capital (debt) for fear that managers will pursue high-risk strategies, transferring wealth from creditors to shareholders (asset substitution problem). 11 Empirical work has shown that firm diversification destroys value and results in the well-known diversification discount. The dominant part of the explanations for the diversification discount suggests that agency costs can be expected to be higher in diversified firms, which in turn could be explained by the fact that the monitoring of the manager's effort is more a greater scope, as the target group of the plan is assumed to be larger. Furthermore, we include a dummy for a dividend-protected plan and performance-vested/indexed plans (PV/indexed plan) to control for the effect of unconventional contract design features. Finally, year indicator variables are included to control for time effects.
Based on the above discussion, our model for the determinants of the scope of the option plan is: (1)
Appendix B provides a summary of our expected signs as well as the categories of theories from which they have been derived.
The exercise price of stock options
Determinants of the second main design attribute of stock option plans, the setting of the exercise price, are investigated by a similar model as in the case of the scope of stock option plans. The empirical model is thus as follows: In equation (2) for the premium, the explanatory variables are mostly the same and often have similar interpretations in terms of the effects they proxy for, as in equation (1) for the scope. However, as the dependent variables in (1) and (2) are opposite in the sense that a larger scope is related to a higher level of compensation, while a higher premium (a higher out-of-the-moneyness) means a lower option and compensation value, the expected signs for the explanatory variables are typically opposite to those in (1). We thus expect, for example, that greater managerial power (higher CEO ownership, and, correspondingly, lower ownership concentration, institutional ownership and state ownership) is negatively related to the stock option premium. A greater degree of power enjoyed by managers leads to more potential benefits they will be able to extract at the expense of shareholders.
Firm size has an ambiguous expected impact on option premium from a theoretical point of view but is included as a control variable. Tobin's Q and firm profitability (cash flow to assets) have an expected negative relation with the stock option premium, as we expect that firms (shareholders)
with lower profitability (reflected in the stock price) require greater stock price appreciation to award managers. Further, we expect investment intensity (investment to capital) and leverage (long-term consequences of diversification.
debt to assets) to be negatively related to the stock option premium. Choe (2003) shows that, other things equal, the optimal exercise price of stock options is decreasing in the riskiness of the firm's desired investment policy and in the degree of financial leverage. More specifically, Choe (2003) argues that greater financial leverage implies a lower exercise value of stock options, which requires downward adjustments of the exercise price, if other components of executive compensation are held fixed.
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We expect prior stock return t o b e i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e s t o c k o p t i o n p r e m i u m . F i r m s (shareholders) are expected to respond to poor prior stock price performance by requiring a higher corresponding stock price appreciation to reward managers. Alternatively, the ability of the manager to negotiate favorable compensation arrangements under the managerial rent extraction hypothesis is expected to be increased following greater stock price appreciation.
The capital to sales ratio, firm focus, and firm risk are again used to proxy for monitoring difficulty/costs. Yermack (1997) argues that firms may want to award discount stock options with inthe-money exercise prices to achieve a larger pay-for-performance sensitivity than what is provided by at-the-money, fair market value stock options. On a share-for-share basis, discount stock options provide higher pay-for-performance sensitivities compared to fair market value stock options (Lambert et al., 1991) . Furthermore, this result may be generalized regarding the exercise price of the stock options, that is, a higher out-of-the-moneyness of the stock option indicates a lower degree of pay for performance, other things equal. Consistent with principal-agent theory, we expect that firms with a higher degree of monitoring costs design compensation structures to provide greater pay-forperformance. The relationship between the stock option premium and both the capital to sales ratio and firm focus (which, when higher, proxy for lower monitoring costs) is expected to be positive, whereas the relation between the premium and the firm risk (total risk, systematic risk and unsystematic risk, all of which increase monitoring costs) is expected to be negative. In a similar 12 Put differently, higher leverage encourages managers to take more risks (asset substitution), which needs to be mitigated through lower exercise prices of stock options.
manner as for the scope of stock option plans in equation (1), we examine whether the premium differs for firms operating in Mature and Growth industries. As mentioned previously, Jin (2002) documents a negative relationship between the level of unsystematic risk and pay-for-performance but fails to find a significant relation between systematic risk and pay-for-performance.
Furthermore, we control for the existence of a prior plan in effect, whether the plan is a broad-based plan, a dividend-protected plan, or a performance-vested/indexed plans (PV/indexed plan). The first two variables have ambiguous expected relations with the stock option premium. For dividendprotected stock options we expect a higher premium, whereas for performance-vested/indexed stock options we expect a lower premium. This is due to the fact that the expected value of the stock option is higher in the case of dividend protection and lower in the case of performance-vesting/indexing, other things equal. As for the scope of stock option plans, we control for time effects by including year indicator variables.
Additional tests regarding scope and exercise prices
The empirical analysis in this paper concentrates on the two main design attributes of stock option plans, that is, the relative size of stock option plans (scope), and the exercise price. This choice is motivated because these attributes are the main considerations that the ultimate compensation providers, that is, the shareholders of the firm, need to address when evaluating and approving compensation proposals. However, because the design of stock option plans contains two main elements, that is, i) the dilution of existing equity holders and ii) the price at which stock may be purchased, it is straightforward to assume that these attributes are simultaneously determined. A trade-off exists between dilution and the associated premium. As a result, to allow for the possibility that the scope and premium of stock option plans are determined simultaneously, we perform a simultaneous equation analysis using three-stage least squares (3SLS), with the scope and premium as endogenous variables. In particular, equations (1) and (2) discussed previously are estimated concurrently. In this analysis, we focus on the specifications of the variables that are expected to be the most critical elements-specifically, the stock option overhang and the (weighted) average premium of the stock option plan.
Furthermore, we extend the analysis of the dynamics of the stock option premium by estimating two categories of discrete decision models. Yermack (1997) argues that if firms really do give great thought to the optimal exercise prices of executive options, one should expect a nontrivial fraction of options to be awarded out-of-the-money. However, the literature shows that these premium options are extremely rare in the U.S., which remains a puzzle. In Finland, the data show that a nontrivial amount of stock options have been awarded with out-of-the-money exercise prices. The Finnish setting thus offers an interesting testing laboratory for factors associated with the granting of premium (out-of-the-money) stock options. As a result, in the first category, we construct dependent variables taking the value of one if i) the first tranche premium is positive and zero otherwise, and ii) the weighted average premium is positive and zero otherwise. Furthermore, to provide additional insights on the factors driving awards of premium stock options, we include an additional restriction in the construction of the dependent variables. In the second category, we construct dependent variables taking the value of one if i) the first tranche premium is positive and the stock option plan is targeted solely to the top management of the firm and zero otherwise, and ii) the weighted average premium is positive for stock options targeted to top management and zero otherwise.
Finally, we also test for the relationship between the length of the vesting period and the size of the premium to test for whether -in line with optimal contracting -the shareholders grant more out-ofthe money options when their vesting period is further in the future. This view is contradictory to that of Bebchuck (2002), who claims that in the U.S., at-the-money options are issued irrespective of the vesting period.
Sample characteristics
This section describes the data sources used in the paper. Furthermore, sample selection issues are discussed. Finally, a descriptive analysis of the data is presented.
Data sources and sample selection
In Finland, executive stock option plans (ESOPs) for listed companies have to be approved by a shareholders' meeting, usually the Annual General Meeting (AGM). The AGM typically approves both the scope of the plan (number of options) and the conditions for setting the exercise prices for the different tranches of the program as well as their vesting periods. 13 The company board then decides, with help from its compensation committee (consisting of some independent board members and excluding the CEO), the structure of the CEO's compensation package and participates in setting Table 1 presents the sample selection procedure in the study. Table 2 presents sample characteristics, divided into Panel A (plan characteristics), Panel B (timing of stock option plans), and Panel C (industry distribution). Of the 141 stock option plans included in the sample, 106 (75%) were targeted to the top management of the firm, whereas 35 (25%) stock option plans were also targeted to non-executive employees (broad-based stock option plans).
Dividend protection is included in 71 (50%) out of the 141 stock option plans in the study, whereas 70 (50%) stock option plans are not subject to dividend protection. Finally, of the sample stock option plans, 12 (9%) involved performance-vesting/indexing, whereas 129 (91%) stock option plans were traditional plans. In Finland, performance-vesting implies in the majority of cases that the exercise of stock options is conditional on whether some accounting-based measure of firm performance is fulfilled (e.g., net profit). Indexing of stock options refers to the policy that the exercise price of stock options is determined relative to, for example, a peer-group benchmark. In addition, Table 2 shows the timing of stock option plans in the sample (introductions and follow-up plans). As can be seen from Table 2 , the majority of stock option plans have been granted in the latter half of the 1990s.
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Finally, Table 2 presents the distribution of stock option plans across industries. The industry classifications are obtained from the accounting data by ETLA. The industry is defined by ETLA as the area where at least 60% of annual sales are generated; otherwise, the firm is classified as being multi-business (diversified). Of the stock option plans in the sample, 30 (21%) were granted by diversified firms. Additionally, we split the firms belonging to the focused category into mature and growth industries. The statistics in Table 2 reveal that 72 (51%) stock options plans in the sample were granted by firms in mature industries, whereas 39 (28%) stock options were launched by firms in growth industries. Table 3 provides a descriptive analysis of the utilized data. The statistics for the scope of stock option plans indicate that the average value for the stock option overhang (dilution) is 3.2% and that the average value of the total Black-Scholes value divided by the market value of equity is 1.4%. As mentioned earlier, the stock option overhang measures the fraction of equity ownership that would result from the exercise of all stock options. Furthermore, the values for the stock option premium 15 Lohja Corporation introduced the first public stock option plan in Finland at the end of year 1987. 16 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this phenomenon is driven by factors such as the abolishment of restricting foreign ownership in Finnish publicly traded firms in 1993, joining the European Monetary Union (EMU), accompanied by the introduction of the euro in 1999, and the favorable development of stock market valuations in the late 1990s. 17 The remaining 21% of the plans were granted in diversified industries. The median value of Tobin's Q for diversified firms, mature firms, and growth firms is 1.113, 1.099, and 2.678, respectively.
Descriptive statistics
(out-of-the-moneyness) indicate that the stock option plans in the sample have, on average, been granted out-of-the-money. The average value for the first tranche premium is 10.4%, whereas the weighted average premium is 11.2% on average. The first tranche premium was positive (out-of-themoney) in 69% of the sample stock option plans, zero (at-the-money) in 11% of the sample stock option plans, and negative (in-the-money) in 20% of the sample stock option plans. The corresponding figures for the weighted average premium are 70% (out-of-the-money), 11% (at-themoney), and 19% (in-the-money).
Empirical results
This section presents and discusses the empirical results. First, we report and discuss the results regarding the determinants of the scope, and the exercise price of stock options, in sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Second, we report results from further specification tests in section 4.3. 18 Instead of the indicator variables for mature and growth industries, we re-estimated the models using dummies for seven industries. The results were unaffected by this change. Also the latter models were re-estimated using industry dummies, without any significant effects on results.
4.1Determinants of the scope of stock option plans
The results reported in Panel A reveal that variables measuring the ownership structure of the firm generally do not seem to be associated with the scope (stock option overhang) of stock option plans.
The coefficients for Tobin's Q are negative and significant at the 1% level in all four specifications.
As mentioned earlier, the predicted relation between Tobin's Q and the scope of stock option plans is ambiguous, dependent on whether one interprets Tobin's Q strictly as a proxy for the degree of growth opportunities or firm performance. If it proxies firm performance, the result is consistent with the view that poorly performing firms introduce larger stock option plans to enforce incentive alignment (motivate managers and employees to maximize shareholder value).
The coefficient for Capital to sales is negative and systematically highly significant at the 1% level.
Furthermore, the coefficients for Total risk are positive and significant at the 5% level. These results are in line with predictions from optimal contracting theory; i.e., consistent with the argument that firms with a high degree of monitoring difficulty/costs (a low ratio of capital to sales and high The coefficient for capital to sales also obtains the expected negative sign in the models in Panel B, and it is again highly significant in both specifications. Long-term debt to assets is positive and significant at the 10% level in specification [I] and at the 5% level in specification [II] . This is in contradiction with the view that debt serves as a substitute for equity incentives (Jensen, 1986 (Jensen, , 1993 , and with the prediction of John and John (1993) that highly levered firms will provide less equity incentives to motivate optimal managerial risk choices. The coefficients for a broad-based plan are positive and significant at the 1% level in specifications [I] and [II] . Finally, the coefficient of dividend-protected plan is positive and significant at the 5% level in both specifications.
In summary, as determinants for the scope of the option plan, we get the strongest results for two variables derived from the optimal contracting theory: the capital to sales ratio as a proxy for monitoring complexity (significantly negative in all specifications), suggesting the higher usage of options in more complex firms, and Tobin's Q (systematically negative, and significant in the stock overhang specifications), which may, in line with e.g., Morck et al. (1988) , be interpreted as a proxy for firm performance, suggesting a higher need to incentivize managers in poorly performing firms where the expected marginal benefits may be larger. The results in Table 5 reveal a similar picture as that shown in Table 4 ; that is, ownership structure does not seem to be related to the design of stock option plans. Also, as in the case of scope, very few potential other determinants obtain significance. One that does is prior stock return, which is inversely related to the stock option premium and significant at the 5% or 10% level throughout the specifications. This result suggests that firms with greater prior stock returns introduce stock options with less demanding features. We interpret this as a sign of firms using stock options as a reward for In summary, we find the prior stock return to be the strongest determinant of the stock option premium, and we also get some support for a performance variable, Cash flow to assets. Both results suggest that firms with better performance grant more favorable executive options, i.e., these results lend some support to the managerial power hypothesis.
Factors driving the exercise price of stock options

Additional tests regarding scope and exercise prices
Estimation results from a simultaneous equation analysis are reported in Table 6 . Stock option overhang and Weighted average premium are treated as endogenous variables. 19 Supporting our expectations, the results suggest that the Stock option premium is positively related to the scope, and vice versa. However, the results are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
More importantly, the results regarding the scope of stock option plans in Table 4 are further strengthened by the results in Table 6 . Specifically, the results suggest that the scope is decreasing in
Tobin's Q and capital to sales and is increasing in total risk. Additionally, the results reveal that the scope is greater in plans targeted to a broader base of employees 20 and that the scope tends to be larger in plans involving dividend protection.
Also in the case of the stock option premium, the results are similar to the corresponding regression results in Table 5 . However, the coefficients for Cash flow to assets and Capital to sales gain higher 19 The explanatory variables correspond to the same variables as in equations (1) and (2), with the exception that an indicator variable for broad-based plans is excluded from the premium specification. This is done to facilitate identification in the simultaneous equation system. This choice was made on the previous results indicating systematic differences in the scope of stock option plans depending on the target group of plans. However, the results in Table 6 were also found to be robust to different choices of explanatory variables. 20 We also estimated a model for the determinants of the likelihood of launching broad-based option plans (using a Probit model). The results (not reported here but available from the authors) suggest that institutional ownership significantly increases the likelihood of granting broad-based stock option plans. We also find that the likelihood of broad-based plans is significantly greater among firms with high growth opportunities, a higher degree of human capital, and more cash flow constraints (a lower free cash flow).
statistical significance in the simultaneous equation analysis. Most importantly, the documented negative impact of Prior stock return on option premium is corroborated by the results in Table 6, where it is negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for dividend-protected plan in the premium specification is positive; however, in this case, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
To further elaborate on factors driving exercise prices, we estimate discrete (Probit) decision models predicting the launch of premium (out-of-the-money) stock option plans. The results of these analyses are reported in Tables 7 and 8 . The dependent variables are constructed on the basis of the (continuous) dependent variables in Table 5 , that is, the first tranche premium and the weighted average premium. In Table 7 , the dependent variable takes the value of one if the plan is launched out-of-the-money and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Table 8 is constructed with an additional restriction; taking the value of one if the stock option plan is granted both out-of-themoney and is targeted to the top management of the firm and zero otherwise. Panel A of Tables 7 and   8 reports regression results where the dependent variable is based on the first tranche premium, whereas Panel B of Tables 7 and 8 reports corresponding results, where the dependent variable is based on the Weighted average premium.
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Inspection of the results regarding ownership structure in both Panels A and B of Table 7 supports the same conclusion as in the previous analyses, that is, ownership structure does not seem to be related to the design of stock option plans.
In line with our expectations for the premium itself, the coefficients for the Investment to capital ratio are negative and statistically significant throughout the specifications. Choe (2003) shows, others things equal, that the optimal exercise price of stock options is decreasing in the riskiness of the 21 The regressions in Table 7 are estimated for a marginally reduced sample (137 observations), as the dependent variable in four observations lacking data on prior stock return is equal to unity. The regressions in Table 8 firm's desired investment policy. The obtained result thus seems to be consistent with this view if one assumes that investment intensity is a proxy for the riskiness of the firm's investment policy.
Furthermore, supporting our expectations and prior findings for the premium itself in Table 5 , the results in Table 7 indicate that the likelihood of granting premium (out-of-the-money) stock options is decreasing in firm profitability (measured as the ratio of Cash flow to assets): the coefficients of the Cash flow to assets ratio are negative and statistically significant in all specifications.
Finally, the coefficients of Capital to sales are again positive (as expected and obtained for the premium itself in Table 5 ) and now statistically significant in all specifications reported in Table 7 .
We have interpreted Capital to sales as a proxy for monitoring complexity. Lower monitoring costs (a higher Capital to sales) seem to be associated with a higher likelihood of granting premium (outof-the-money) stock options, which is in line with our expectations, as on a share-for-share basis, the pay-for-performance sensitivity of out-of-the-money stock options is lower than that of corresponding in-the-money-or at-the-money stock options (see, e.g., Lambert et al., 1991).
Regression results predicting the launch of premium stock options targeted to top management are reported in Table 8 . The dependent variable in Table 8 takes the value of one if the stock option plan is launched out-of-the-money and is targeted to the top management, and zero otherwise. The results in Table 8 are, in general, similar to the results reported in Table 7 . First, the coefficients of the Investment to capital are negative and statistically significant throughout the specifications in Table 8 and thus support the results reported in Table 7 . The previously documented negative relation between the likelihood of granting premium stock options and firm profitability is further reassured by the results in Table 8 , with all coefficients of Cash flow to assets being negative and statistically significant in the reported specifications. Finally, in contradiction with the results presented in Table   7 , the results in Table 8 suggest that a higher Capital to sales (lower monitoring costs) reduces the likelihood of granting premium stock options to top management.
Finally, we test the relationship between the premium and the vesting period. Bebchuk (2002) claims that in the U.S., at-the-money options are issued irrespective of the vesting period. Our material for all tranches granted at the same time allows us to test for this. In the case of only one tranche issued, the average vesting time in our sample is 2.69 years, and the average premium is 8.9%. When two separate tranches are issued, the average vesting periods are 2.4 and 3.9 years, and the average premiums are 6.4% and 10.8%. The difference has a prob-value of 0.0197; that is, it is significant at the 2% level. This result supports the optimal contracting view in the sense that when no institutional factors drive granting at-the-money options, the shareholders will grant more out-of-the-money options when their vesting periods are further in the future so as not to reduce the incentives of the managers over time (i.e., to avoid rewarding simply for "the passing of time").
Summary and conclusions
This paper examines the relations between firm characteristics and the design of stock option plans for Finnish firms. Most existing empirical studies concentrate on the incentive effects provided by equity-based compensation (see, e.g., Yermack, 1995). Nonetheless, the variation in contract design is rather limited for U.S. firms, especially in setting exercise prices, which is caused by tax and accounting considerations (Murphy, 1999) . However, Finnish firms are not subject to the tax-and accounting-induced restrictions in the design of stock option plans. This paper thus extends the literature in the following ways. We examine determinants of the two main design attributes of stock option plans: the scope of stock option plans and the setting of exercise prices. In practice, these two variables are the main considerations that shareholders need to decide on when evaluating and approving compensation proposals. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide a rigorous analysis of the factors determining the exercise price of stock options. We also study the relationship between the out-of-the-moneyness of the granted options and the length of their vesting period when options are granted from several tranches.
We find that the scope of the option plan is inversely related to Tobin's Q. Several prior studies employ Tobin's Q as a m e asure o f fi rm pe rfo rm an ce ( se e , e .g ., Mo rc k e t al ., 1988) . I n th at interpretation, this result suggests that poorly performing firms grant larger stock option plans.
Furthermore, we find that the scope of stock option plans is decreasing in the capital to sales ratio of the firm and in firm size and is increasing in firm risk. These results are consistent with traditional principal-agent theory arguing that greater monitoring costs/difficulty should be positively related to the amount of equity-based compensation used (Holmström, 1979; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) and with the idea that management productivity increases less than proportionally with firm size (Baker and Hall 2004) .
The size of the stock option premium (its out-of-the-moneyness) is found to be strongly negatively related to the prior stock return. This result is consistent with the view that shareholders respond to poor prior stock price performance by requiring a higher corresponding stock price appreciation to reward managers. Alternatively, the result may indicate that managers have more negotiation power regarding the design of compensation in firms with greater prior stock price performance, leading to more in-the-money options. In different specifications for the option premium, as well as the likelihood for launching premium options, we also obtain support for other variables related to firm profitability, strengthening the view that less (more) profitable firms are more likely to grant premium (discount, i.e., in-the-money) options. Because we also get support for variables that proxy for monitoring costs, our results concerning the exercise price setting support both optimal contracting variables but may also be interpreted as lending some support to the managerial power hypothesis.
Finally, we report a significant positive relationship between the option premium (out-of-themoneyness) and the length of the vesting period. Here, our results support an optimal contracting view in the sense that when no institutional factors drive towards granting at-the-money options, the shareholders will grant more out-of-the-money options when the vesting periods are further in the future so as not to reduce the incentives of the managers over time.
Appendix A. Variable definitions for key variables
The For options without dividend protection, we use the Merton (1973) model, i.e., adjust for expected dividends using the annual dividend yield; otherwise, we use the B&S (1973) model. The risk-free rate is the 3-month money market rate (HELIBOR, later EURIBOR) at grant date. The stock return volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns over 250 previous trading days (with a minimum of 60 observations as inclusion criteria). The total value of stock options in one tranche is their B&S value (with tranche specific parameters) multiplied by the number of shares obtainable upon exercise of all options in that tranche. The total value of stock options granted to the market value of equity is obtained by summing the total values of all tranches in a stock option plan and dividing this value by the market value of firm equity at grant date.
Stock option premium (tranche specific)
Calculated as (X-S)/S, where S is the current stock price and X is as follows: 1.) If the exact exercise price of stock options is specified at the grant date, then this value is used as X. This is the case in most stock option plans in the study. 2.) If the exercise price is defined as the average exercise price during some specified time period in the future, then the stock option is assumed to be granted at-the-money (X=S). 3.) If the exercise price of the option is defined as the average exercise price during some time period in the future plus a fixed or percentage premium, then the option is assumed to be granted with an exercise price equal to S plus the given premium. 4.) If the exercise price of the option cannot be determined with certainty at the date of grant, but a certain minimum exercise price is specified, then the option is assumed to be granted with that minimum exercise price. This is the case in a number of performance-vested/indexed stock options.
First tranche premium
[(X-S)/S], where X is the exercise price in the first tranche of the option plan, and S is the stock price grant date.
Weighted average premium (option plan specific)
A weighted sum of the stock option premiums of all tranches in an option plan. As weights, the ratio of the number of shares obtainable upon exercise of an individual stock option tranche, divided by the total number of shares obtainable upon exercise of all tranches, has been used.
The target group of the stock option plans
Stock option plans are defined as being targeted to top management if that group is the sole target of the plan. If stock options are also targeted to non-executive employees, the stock option plan is defined as a broad-based plan.
CEO ownership
The fraction of shares held by the CEO of the firm. Pörssitieto only records the 20 largest shareholders of the firm. This variable thus takes the value of zero if the CEO is not among this group of shareholders.
Ownership concentration
The fraction of shares held by the three largest shareholders. To filter out the effect of state ownership, ownership concentration is calculated excluding state ownership. For example, if the Finnish state is the second-largest shareholder of the firm, then ownership concentration is calculated as the fraction of shares held by the first-, third-, and fourth-largest shareholders of the firm.
Institutional ownership, State ownership
Indicator variables taking the value of one if a financial institution or the state is among the three largest shareholders respectively and zero otherwise.
Appendix A (continued)
Foreign ownership
The fraction of shares held by foreign investors at the end of the accounting period.
Firm size
The logarithm of the book value of assets.
Tobin's Q
The market value of equity and the book value of total debt, divided by the book value of assets. Market values of equity (annual) are obtained from KOP Pörssiyhtiöt manuals and Kauppalehti databases.
Investment to capital
Gross investment in fixed assets during the accounting period divided by fixed assets (book value of gross plant, property, and equipment)
Long-term debt to assets
The book value of long-term debt divided by the book value of assets.
Cash flow to assets
The ratio of EBITDA to the book value of assets.
Free cash flow to assets
The ratio of EBITDA less gross investment and total dividends to the book value of assets.
Prior stock return
The 6-month (125 trading days) logarithmic stock return preceding the end of the accounting period during the year before the launch of stock option plans.
Capital to sales
The ratio of fixed assets (book value of gross plant, property, and equipment) to sales.
Wages per employee
The ratio of total labor costs to the average number of employees.
Firm focus
An dummy that takes the value of 1 if at least 60% of the firm's annual sales are generated from one specific industry segment according to ETLA's classification, and zero otherwise (diversified industry).
Mature vs. Growth
Firm focus is further decomposed into mature and growth industries. See Table 2 , Panel C, for which industries have been classified as mature vs. growth industries.
Total risk
The variance of daily stock total returns during the firm's accounting period, using a minimum of 60 daily stock returns as inclusion criteria.
Systematic risk
Estimated by a year-to-year market model regression based on daily stock returns, and calculated as the squared beta multiplied by the variance of daily market index returns 22 .
Unsystematic risk
Residual variance from a year-to-year market model regression based on daily stock returns.
Appendix B. Summary of expected signs for key explanatory variables
The table summarizes the expected signs for our key variables in the models for the scope of the stock option plan as well as the exercise price. The signs are mainly derived using predictions from either the optimal contracting literature or the managerial power literature. "+/-" denotes a case where there are theoretical arguments for both a positive and a negative effect, whereas "?" denotes a case where, based on theoretical arguments, an expectation for the sign is hard to formulate for some control variable that we still want to include in the model. Prior stock return is only included in model II. Merton (1973) . Stock options specifically protected against dividend payments are valued using standard Black-Scholes methodology. The stock option premium (out-of-the-moneyness) is defined as [(X-S)/S], where X corresponds to the exercise price of the option and where S is the stock price at the grant date. The firsttranche stock option premium is calculated as the out-of-the-moneyness of the stock options belonging to the first tranche in the stock option plan. The weighted average stock option premium utilizes information of the characteristics of the total stock option plan. The weights used in the calculation correspond to the ratio of the number of shares obtainable upon exercise in each individual stock option tranche divided by the total number of shares obtainable upon exercise of all stock options. Data on foreign ownership are only available from the Finnish Central Securities Depositary (FCSD) from October 1993 onwards, and due to this, data on foreign ownership are missing in 24 observations. Complete data on prior stock return are missing in four observations. A t-test (assuming unequal variances) is used to investigate equality in means in Panels B and C. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. All risk measures are multiplied by 100. See Appendix A for a definition of variables. Table 5 . Determinants of the stock option premium
I. Model
The stock option premium (out-of-the-moneyness) is defined as [(X-S)/S], where X corresponds to the exercise price of the option and where S is the stock price at the grant date. In Panel A, the first tranche premium is calculated as the out-of-themoneyness of the stock options belonging to the first tranche in the stock option plan. In Panel B, the weighted average stock option premium utilizes information of the characteristics of the total stock option plan. The weights used in the calculation correspond to the ratio of the number of shares obtainable upon exercise in each individual stock option tranche divided by the total number of shares obtainable upon exercise of all stock options. The independent variables are measured at the end of the previous year. A full set of year dummies is included in all specifications (not reported). All risk measures are multiplied by 100. Data for prior stock returns are missing in four observations. We apply the method utilized by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Jin (2002) , among others; i.e., we set missing observations of prior stock returns to zero and include a separate indicator variable that takes the value of one for missing observations and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Estimation is conducted utilizing OLS. The t-statistics (reported beneath each regression coefficient) are calculated using robust standard errors. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. Table 6 . Simultaneous equation analysis of scope and premium of stock option plans
The table reports estimation results using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method. The scope of the stock option plans (stock option overhang) is measured as the fraction of equity obtained upon exercise of all granted stock options, i.e., as the ratio of the number of shares exercisable to the sum of shares exercisable and the number of outstanding shares at the date of the grant. Weighted average stock option premium (out-of-the-moneyness) is defined as [(X-S)/S], where X corresponds to the exercise price of the option and where S is the stock price at the grant date. The weights used in the calculation correspond to the ratio of the number of shares obtainable upon exercise in each individual stock option tranche divided by the total number of shares obtainable upon exercise of all stock options. The independent variables are measured at the end of the previous year. A full set of year dummies is included in all specifications (not reported). All risk measures are multiplied by 100. Data for prior stock returns are missing in four observations. We apply the method utilized by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Jin (2002) , among others; i.e., we set missing observations of prior stock returns to zero and include a separate indicator variable that takes the value of one for missing observations and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for variable definitions. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Independent variables
Weighted average premium Table 7 . Probit estimation results predicting the launch of premium stock option plans
The stock option premium (out-of-the-moneyness) is defined as [(X-S)/S], where X corresponds to the exercise price of the option and where S is the stock price at the grant date. The first tranche premium is calculated as the out-of-the-moneyness of the stock options belonging to the first tranche in the stock option plan. In Panel A, the dependent variable takes the value of one if the first tranche premium is positive and zero otherwise. The weighted average stock option premium utilizes information of the characteristics of the total stock option plan. The weights used in the calculation correspond to the ratio of the number of shares obtainable upon exercise in each individual stock option tranche divided by the total number of shares obtainable upon exercise of all stock options. In Panel B, the dependent variable takes the value of one if the weighted average premium is positive and zero otherwise. The independent variables are measured at the end of the previous year. All risk measures are multiplied by 100. The dependent variable in four observations lacking data on prior stock return is set equal to unity. The regressions are therefore estimated for the reduced sample (137 observations) including complete data on prior stock returns. See Appendix A for variable definitions. The t-statistics (reported beneath each regression coefficient) are calculated using robust standard errors. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. The stock option premium (out-of-the-moneyness) is defined as [(X-S)/S], where X corresponds to the exercise price of the option and where S is the stock price at the grant date. The first tranche premium is calculated as the out-of-the-moneyness of the stock options belonging to the first tranche in the stock option plan. In Panel A, the dependent variable takes the value of one if the first tranche premium is positive and the plan is targeted solely to top management and zero otherwise. The weighted average stock option premium utilizes information of the characteristics of the total stock option plan. The weights used in the calculation correspond to the ratio of the number of shares obtainable upon exercise in each individual stock option tranche divided by the total number of shares obtainable upon exercise of all stock options. In Panel B, the dependent variable takes the value of one if the weighted average premium is positive and the plan is targeted solely to top management and zero otherwise. The independent variables are measured at the end of the previous year. All risk measures are multiplied by 100. Data for prior stock return are missing in four observations. We apply the method utilized by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Jin (2002) , among others; i.e., we set missing observations of prior stock return to zero and include a separate indicator variable that takes the value of one for missing observations and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for variable definitions. The t-statistics (reported beneath each regression coefficient) are calculated using robust standard errors. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
